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The Transparency 
Of All Things 
Adelino Zanini 
I 
In this paper I wish to discuss a few of the attributes of Politics 
[il politico] at the junction between the Modem and Postmodern 
ages. Let me begin by making the following assumptions: 
A) The Modem is both the apology of the subject and the 
dissolution of its individual freedom; 
B) The Modem is where this socialization takes on "liturgical 
values," which are supposed to negate the mysteries surrounding 
social and collective existence; 
C) This negation explains but doesn't solve the tragic recourse 
to supreme and sublime beings [entita]; 
D) This negation substitutes theological ratio with that which 
disenchantment discloses. 
Therefore, if each theodicy can be secularized and god's pre-
sence in the world dissolved, what becomes of this transparency 
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of all things? How far does Politics, as decisions, still condition 
rationally human destiny? 
In search of an answer, I will start with J. A. Schumpeter. If 
we respect the interpretive rules of economic theory, this intention 
may seem rather strange. However, let's assume that these rules 
are not completely reliable (Zanini 1987 & 1988). If this hypothesis 
is true, one question raised by Schumpeter appears to anticipate 
all the others. According to this Austrian scholar (Schumpeter 
1954), all political rationalities in modern society are inspired by 
rational forma mentis. Yet when in opposition to one another, it 
does not necessarily follow that the outcome of the confrontation 
is itself rational; indeed, the effects are not rationally explainable. 
So the question becomes: How are we to interpret modern events? 
In other words: What would happen to the transparency in a 
world in which god is disclosed, transfigured into a being who 
governs on the basis of the instrumental rationalities of things? 
II 
There are, of course, many possible answers. I'll begin by 
saying that, in Schumpeter's view, the position which argues for 
a resistant theological substratum in Politics (Marramao 1983) is 
not at all clear. This process of secularization, however undoubt-
able it may be, is based on yet another illusion: that the nihilism 
inherent in the logic of Politics induces an efficient rationalization, 
which in a sort of instrumental disenchantment can seize the time 
of decision-abandoning thus any idea of redemption to the 
metaphysics of resentment. Such a solution presumes that, 
beyond the impossibility of an earthly redemption, there remains 
an efficient, albeit arbitrary, answer: a game of possible decisions. 
In reality, both this possibility and the fact that it may have a 
decipherable sense, or that there are any rules at all for the game, 
remain questionable. Therefore, neither the observation on sec-
ularization processes, nor the assumption that the sacred has even 
"higher" coefficients of resistance to oppose to rationalization, 
seems to offer a full answer. In some way, modern disenchantment 
discloses more and yet implies, without paradox, fewer solutions. 
I think this is the meaning of the undecidable conflict shown by 
Schumpeter. 
In fact, Schumpeter leaves us with an unsolved puzzle: the 
modern relationship between economic science and political sys-
tem. Schumpeter, one of the greatest scholars of the dissolution 
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of neoclassical theory, had understood the political terms of this 
dissolution without, however, deducing from them "logical" polit-
ical consequences. The reasons for this loss can be briefly sum-
marized. Believing in the action of the single entrepreneur-far 
more representative than economic theory has shown-Schumpe-
ter did not refer to a Nietzschean figure, but to a Schopenhauerian 
individuality, which is the basis for the relationship between the 
will of the subject (his business ability) and the representation of 
this will (its economic explication). Along this path, however, 
having measured the distance between the logical nature of 
economic variables and the socio-logical nature of the political 
variables, Schumpeter reaches a real metaphysics of the Modern. 
Yet he cannot solve the doubleness of the Modern between indi-
viduality and socialization (to use Weberian terminology). There-
fore, since Politics is unrepresentable according to economic recta 
ratio, it escapes from the subject entrepreneur and, in escaping 
him, confirms its socialization, its loss of a singular sense. Will 
and representation are displaced: the former due to the loss of all 
individuality "centered" in itself (think of Sombartian Entseelung), 
the latter due to the consequent impossibility of the logical rep-
resentation of what is the willful action of the single subject. 
Schumpeter's arguments may of course seem marginal to the 
initial problem, but what is interesting to observe is its paradoxical 
effect. The puzzle cannot fail to produce, after Weber, the clear 
knowledge that the representatum, the rationality of doing, is not 
lost because its forms are hidden, because they are in fact evident. 
And what is evident itself does not need to be represented, for 
the simple reason that nothing can be added to what is already 
evident. And even before Schumpeter, already in Marx, this is 
the true meaning of the unfolding of real submission. Utmost 
submission is no longer realized through forms of equivalence 
since it expresses, in its "natural" being, disproportion as the only 
unit of measure. By analogy, in Wittgenstein, the limits of lan-
guage are in play. How can we enlighten what is already light, 
or whose lightness escapes our "sensors"? 
In Schumpeter, however, neither Marxian, nor Wittgenstein-
ian knowledge is present; it is not by chance that he accepts the 
role of "prophet." The puzzle of the Modern is only avoided. The 
fact that the conflict is undecidable leaves no room for rational 
expectations, but this gives rise to a void, which Schumpeter tries 
to fill, in a Schopenhauerian way, with enlightenment, or proph-
ecy. Sidestepping the puzzle, however, in no way removes the 
DIFFERENT/A 68 
paradox, which is basically this: the more transparent the modern 
condition, the more unlikely its government, since nothing can 
be said which is not in the things themselves (Virno 1986): nothing, 
except inauspicious prophecy. 
The simple mechanism of secularization of the Modern, on 
the other hand, does not explain what Schumpeter backs away 
from, as it doesn't explain if and how what is itself light is also 
in itself clear-not to mention "sensible." Schumpeter's paradox 
is usefully provocative, perhaps because it is solved only partially 
in the realization of the Modern, anticipating, in spite of every-
thing, some essential lines of escape. 
III 
These themes are present also in Heidegger (1977). For exam-
ple, in The Age of the World Picture, he writes: "Science as research 
constitutes itself only if truth is transformed into the certainty of 
representation." Since Descartes, and including Nietzsche, this is 
the course of the subject, which decides its accomplishment. The 
representation, the formation of an image of the world, "the con-
figuration of representing production" -as Heidegger himself af-
firms-is the means by which man tries to be a being "who counts 
as a rule and canon for every being." In the end, the struggle 
between the different visions of the world expresses the calculating 
power of the subject, its "dominating the world," which causes 
and ends in the "absorption of modern essence in obviousness." 
In my opinion, this obviousness, as it spreads in an incalcul-
able way, does produce a shadow "which escapes representation"; 
but this shadow, rather than enunciating "something else whose 
understanding is denied to us today," seems to solve itself in a 
total transparency which escapes representation, not so much 
because it is obscure, but because it is too enlightened, clear, 
obvious. 
It is sufficient to underline here the crucialness of the obvious 
as the image of the modern world, and, even before, the constitu-
tion of the modern world as the representation of images. For the 
question remains: What relationship does man's public destiny, 
Politics as human destiny, have with a world where the incumbent 
image of a god is not only returned to earth but, even before, 
disclosed according to the instrumental rationality of the things 
themselves? 
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IV 
I would like to try to answer this question starting with a 
typical concept of political science: the secret. Often, it is well 
known, democratic political criticism has appealed to and calls on 
"transparency" as the essential criterion of modern democracy. 
Interpreting a typical demand of emancipation movements, the 
abolition of the secret has always appeared as the essential criter-
ion of publicity, belonging to the public, and therefore subject to 
public criticism . 
Without meaning to deny or simplify what hails from a com-
plex tradition of thought (Koselleck 1959), I would like to observe 
that probably the appeal of transparency, of the publicity of the 
choices of the executive power, has never been a suitable concept 
for "another" democracy. In other words, I think it has been a 
concept appropriate to the absence of secret: a kind of harmless 
paradox. 
It is sufficiently clear, however, that secretiveness does not 
preserve a secret, but rather invents the conditions which ought 
to keep a secret-if there is one. Often, the appeal to transparency 
is a question of method with respect to substantially known con-
tents-if not, indeed, obvious. Of course, transparency had a 
different weight for the bourgeoise parliaments that sprung up 
after 1848, when modes, times and channels of information and 
the multiplication of information were different. But even in those 
times, the demand for transparency was not used for enlighten-
ment, but to force confession. Basically, the demand asked that 
instrumental modes of action be represented, because the action 
itself was known. Secretiveness was blamed for the failure of 
representation, and secretiveness was blamed for the failure of 
democracy . Actually, the absence of secrets, clarity, characterizes 
most contemporary democracies. In fact, transparency is not a 
criterion of discriminating value at all. 
It is worthwhile pointing out that the philosophical nature of 
my affirmation simply wishes to state that it is very difficult to 
deny evidence to what things show because, in general, democ-
racy is a political regime where the exhibition of obviousness is 
constant--even if this is not an intrinsic merit, but a historical 
acquisition. 
Let us refer for a moment to recent experience. The depriva-
tion of the authority of parliaments-incorrectly called the "crisis" 
of representative institutions-is manifest; the left wing appeals 
to transparency in decision making: but what is it that remains 
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obscure, or unsaid? Absolutely nothing . Not only: it is just at the 
moment when executive power shows its greatest certainty, rep-
resentative capacity, that the demand for transparency becomes 
pure, insignificant dialectical expedient. 
V 
Of course, to draw hasty conclusions from this would be 
improper. Therefore, I will just underline the passage: man's pub-
lic destiny and modern Politics may become the "business of a 
few" simply because they are evident to everyone. The greatest 
transparency has paralyzed any demand for clearness. For this 
reason, it is also difficult to charge any one political system with 
the absence of rationality; more simply, one could blame it for its 
criteria of instrumental rationality. In conclusion, taking up the 
result of the Schumpeterian paradox again, we may see how the 
undecidable conflict is actually a tragic determinant. 
How far, then, does modern Politics rationally condition 
human destiny? It is one thing if by modern Politics we mean the 
mass of experiences which has characterized the world up to a 
given time, before ours. It is a different question if we accept the 
definition of our times as the impossible accomplishment of the 
Modern. In the latter case-leaving aside the validity of the "pas-
sage," true or presumed, possible or not, between Modern and 
Postmodern-we might say that it is not really Politics which 
conditions human destiny, but its operative techniques . On the 
other hand, if we say this, we would reaffirm a hidden truth, a 
shadow which holds promise. In the age of its accomplishment, 
modern Politics, in fact, deeply conditions human destiny, but 
without any rationality; rather, it conditions human destiny in 
the most complete obviousness, or transparency. This is the reason 
why the human condition is tragic, but for the same reason, the 
tragedy is a kind of salvation (Negri 1987). 
VI 
Having unveiled god, this secularization ripened in the West-
ern ratio has removed all secrets. The deus absconditus is dissolved: 
man's destiny is completely disenchanted and therefore com-
pletely conditioned by tragedy. But in this tragedy, man does not 
expiate any existential or mystic condemnation: it is man's social, 
historically determined condition. This destiny is not singular, it 
is collective. The absence of the secret forces us to live our destiny 
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collectively. It is not the destiny of a people, it is my, our destiny: 
it is difference, not solitude. The absence of secrets forces us to 
live publicly every moment, total transparency bares any sense 
of shame. 
In some ways, we are propelled toward an aesthetic of the 
tragic perfectly described by Lyotard (1983). The babel of lan-
guages, the exponential growth of rationality, the lack of fixed 
referents rather than relativizing the power of saying, of being 
transparent, amplifies its relevance. One must not stop in the 
shade: the shade, like silence, is a way of saying that speaks louder 
and states more violently what it would like to hide. But it does 
not talk about us: it does not speak to us. Languages talk about 
themselves, Politics celebrates its techniques. All this is really 
America (Baudrillard 1986), empire of gigantism: nothing is sim-
pler, and therefore impenetrable-as Heidegger says-everything 
is tragic, consuming itself in public, giving rise to an aesthetic of 
the tragic in its accomplishment. 
Having mentioned Lyotard, we are inevitably reminded of 
Wittgenstein: the mystic situated not only in the accomplishment 
of linguistic transparency, but where language is no longer man's. 
In fact, in the end the game becomes exasperated: it says too 
much, it alludes to too many senses-the mystic is necessary 
enchantment. Nevertheless, an aesthetic of the tragic, if it is true 
that it describes human destiny as a difference and not as solitude, 
seems to invoke positively what in Deleuze, for example, is the 
thought of difference: turbines of active forces. 
Is there no longer a sublime? Of course, a secularized god is 
a jealous, vengeful god. But he too, in this obviousness, is destined 
only to transparent liturgies to keep a semblance of a mystical, 
ineffable body. On the contrary, to imperfect bodies belongs the 
sign of difference and contingency. The great Cartesian fiction is 
dead, the omnipotent subject is dead: after Foucault, the attributes 
of the ratio to the perfect body are disclosed. But because of this, 
the unfinished accomplishment of the Modern leaves a much 
more significant paradox unsolved: an ensemble of collective sub-
jects, whose bodies speak, whose reasons listen . 
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